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HARVARD LAW REVIEW
HUSBAND AND WIFE AS STATUTORY HEIRS
A T common law husband and wife were not heirs of eachother. Dower and curtesy were interests in land arising out
of marriage and existing inter vivos. They became consum-
mate in the survivor upon death, but they were not inheritable
interests which belonged to the deceased while he lived and passed
to his heirs when he died. Furthermore, dower and curtesy were
primarily provisions for the support of the surviving spouse. In
both cases they were life interests only and were designed to carry
on the obligation of support in the case of dower, or to give a rea-
sonable provision for the survivor co-extensive with his rights
during marriage, in the case of curtesy. By the common law
scheme the wife's personalty belonged to the husband as an inci-
dent of the marriage, while the realty of both spouses passed to
their blood relatives upon death, subject to a life interest in one-
third of the husband's realty in the case of the wife, and a life
interest in all the wife's realty, if there were issue born alive in
the case of the husband. During marriage the husband was
legally bound to support his wife, and she obtained a life interest
in one-third of his realty to continue this support when he died,
while the husband had an absolute right to all the profits as well
as the management of his wife's realty during life, and under the
doctrine of curtesy he obtained a life interest in all her realty
if he survived.
Dower and curtesy in their common law form and without
supplementary legislation have not survived to the present day.
In England their utility was largely destroyed by the creation of
jointures, first at law and later by separate equitable estates for
married women, which were given in lieu of dower. While dower
and curtesy had largely lost their usefulness, they remained to
embarrass conveyancers and to cause uncertainty of title and
burdensome litigation, as well as expense and inconvenience."
Moreover, at common law, dower could not be barred except by
levying a fine, a process which was remunerative to the Crown,
1 i REPORT OF TnE REAL PROPERTY CommISsIOm (1829) 6-ig.
330
HUSBAND AND WIFE AS STATUTORY HEIRS
but exceedingly expensive for the individual.2 This defect was
remedied by the Dower Act of 1834, which provided for the
destruction of dower by deed or will,3 leaving dower and curtesy
as interests that arose only upon intestacy." Even in this limited
form, they were formally abolished by the Real Property Acts of
1925.5 Thus in England today there is no legal duty which will
prevent a husband or wife from refusing to provide for the sur-
vivor. In practice, of course, people of property make any neces-
sary provision by jointure upon marriage, or by other forms of
property settlements. It is fair to say," however, that even these
marriage settlements likewise seem designed primarily to provide
for the reasonable maintenance of the survivor, as in the case of
dower and curtesy, rather than to effect a fair division of the
property of either spouse.
In the United States the development of common law dower and
curtesy has had a decidedly different course. Although we do
not have the social practice of antenuptial agreements, :we have
statutes designed to increase the amount of property covered by
dower and curtesy so as to make these interests more than life
provisions for the surviving spouse. Usually our statutes provide
that the survivor shall have an absolute interest in one-third of
the realty and the personalty of the deceased. Quite significantly,
also, the wife often receives her interest free from the claims of
creditors, as dower was at common law.6 This is more than a
rough approximation of a provision for the survivor's life, since
it is not fair to say that the interests of the children, who take
as heirs, are merely provisions for their lives, and where there
are two or more children, the widow under our statutes obtains
as much or more than any child. Furthermore, our statutes have
made the surviving husband and wife heirs of each other on in-
testacy. According to the usual scheme of intestacy, the wife
inherits all the property when there are surviving neither children,
nor father or mother, nor brother or sister of the deceased.' Fre-
2 See the commentary by J. Tyrrell in i id. 490-92.
s 3 & 4 WM. IV, c. Xo5, § 4 (1834).
4 3 & 4 WM. IV, c. 1o, §§ 4-6 (1834).
5 x5 GEo. V, C. 23, §48 (1925).
6 Tate v. Jay, 31 Ark. 576 (1876); Roan v. Holmes,,32 Fla. 295 (1893); 1
STimsoN, AwmCAc STATUTE LAW (1881) § 3262.
7 1 STimsox, AmERIcAN STATUTE LAW (i88i) §§ 3109, 3119, 3262.
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quently she inherits one-half or more of all the property in every
case where the deceased does not leave children.8
We shall have occasion to refer to these statutory provisions as
(i) statutory dower, and (2) statutory heirship. The interest
to which the surviving spouse is entitled under the law, and which
the deceased cannot take away by deed or will, is statutory
dower. The interest which the surviving spouse takes as heir in
the intestate property is his interest as statutory heir. For in-
stance, if the husband gives all his property to a charity, and
makes no provision for his wife, the widow is entitled to her
statutory dower in spite of this will. In most states this is one-
third of the realty and one-third of the personalty. If, however,
the gift to the charity was void under the local statute governing
charitable gifts, and if the deceased left no blood relatives of his
immediate family, the widow would then inherit all his property
as statutory heir. In brief, her interest as statutory heir can be
taken from her by will, but if the testator does not dispose of his
property by will, she may receive much more as statutory heir
than under her statutory dower right.
In conjunction with the widow's extraordinary position as heir
under modern statutes, as compared with the common law situa-
tion where she was not an heir at all, we have already noted that
under modern statutory dower she is a forced heir as to one-third
of all her husband's property, while of course the other heirs may
be excluded by deed or will. In view of this situation, one cannot
but ask why it is that dower and curtesy are extended in the
United States, and private agreements foi their destruction are
not employed, while in England dower and curtesy were first
circumvented and then abolished, and private schemes in place
of them have been extensively used. If we seek to explain this
on the ground that social customs and obligations are different in
England, we must consider that several of the Canadian provinces
also have abolished dower and curtesy.9 At the present time our
8 I id. §§ 3119, 3123; 1 WOERNER, ADmINISTRATIO (1920) § 67.
-See, e.g., Barn. COL. REv. STAT. (1924) c. 71, § 9. But a disinherited widow
has an equitable claim to support. BRIT. COL. RFv. STAT. (1924) C. 256. This
equitable claim to support may be a solution of the problem of common law dower
and curtesy. Thus in British Columbia and several other provinces, dower and
curtesy are abolished, but if the widow is not sufficiently provided for by her
htisband's will, she may apply to 4 court of equity. Thie qoqrt is atithorized to
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statutory dower and curtesy and our statutes making husband
and wife heirs of each other are liberally interpreted by the courts
and vigorously enforced.1" Are we to assume that even modern
statutory dower is to continue a "favorite of the law," as common
law dower once was, or is it likely that in the United States there
will arise private agreements in lieu of dower among the people
generally, and that statutory dower and curtesy will be privately
circumvented and finally abolished?
Although common law dower and curtesy have been superseded
by more extensive statutory provisions in the United States, the
decisions of the courts in construing dower and curtesy are still
used in the interpretation of our present statutes. Consequently,
the legal rules and principles incident to the common law system
are usually applied to the present statutory system. Moreover,
these legal principles are applied under modem conditions when
it is possible for either spouse to make a gift inter vivos to the
other, when the wife may acquire property and make contracts as
if she were unmarried, and when provision for the surviving
spouse by way of insurance and living trusts is the rule rather
than the exception. Under these circumstances it would be
strange if the common law principles of dower and curtesy were
alvays to apply to our statutory provisions without occasioning
determine whether the provision made is adequate, and to grant an increased al-
lowance from the husband's estate if necessary. These statutes both in terms and
in the manner of administration by the courts give the widow reasonable pro-
tection for her support in view of the amount of the estate involved. Such pro-
vision is of course more than the "necessary allowance" given under the Austrian
code. AvSTRIAN Cvi CODE (1898) § 798.
We shall not venture to discuss this solution of the problem for two reasons:
(i) These statutes give the courts of equity rather wide and uncertain powers in
disposing of estates according to the needs of the widow. It does not appear that
such discretion by a court of equity is necessary in order to protect the widow,
and it does not seem likely that such legislation would meet with favor in the
United States if equally good results could be secured without qualifying in any
way the freedom of testation. (2) Such statutes do not cover a compulsory fair
division of the testator's estate, which is implied in community property and in
the statutory dower and curtesy of today, and by which the surviving spouse
takes an absolute one-third interest in both realty and personalty. It is in keep-
ing with our customs to have a division of the testator's property which shall be
approximately fair in most cases. Not to provide at all for a compulsory division
or to handle such division by antenuptial agreements would amount to a radical
change, and would be equally out of keeping with our social structure.
10 2 TFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) § i895.
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
some inconsistencies and some unfortunate results. In the fol-
lowing pages we shall first examine some of the legal situations in
which statutory dower and curtesy and statutory heirship of the
surviving spouse are subjected to common law interpretation. Ex-
cept with respect to the claims of creditors, these situations occur
most significantly where there is a partial intestacy. Secondly,
we shall consider the effect of statutory dower and curtesy upon
the claims of creditors. And in this connection also we shall dis-
cuss the need of protecting creditors by changes in our statutes,
as well as the advisability of other changes in statutory dower and
curtesy and statutory heirship for husband and wife.
I
Even a cursory examination of the current digests will disclose
the large number of cases involving partial intestacy which ap-
pear in the reports every year. A situation frequently encoun-
tered is that of a void or lapsed legacy. Most jurisdictions now
provide that after-acquired realty will pass by the will, but in
others this still causes a partial intestacy. Or the testator may
dispose of life interests in property and not dispose of the fee,
thus making it apparent on the face of the will that there must'lbe
a partial intestacy. There are two instances which very often
occur under modern conditions: (i) where one has created a liv-
ing trust which later turns out to be invalid; (2) where the
testator has his life insurance paid to his estate and does not name
the beneficiary in his will. It is true that a well drawn residuary
clause will in most jurisdictions catch this property, but it is sig-
nificant to note that some residuary clauses are not extensive
enough and that the testator may well omit a residuary clause,
especially where he thinks he has disposed of most of his property
in a living trust and undertakes to cover only a few things in his
will. Another frequent cause of partial intestacy is where the
residuary clause itself fails. Finally, a partial intestacy arises
where the testator has just before his death conveyed property as
gifts in order to avoid inheritance taxes. Where these attempted
transfers are not completed inter vivos, the property will pass to
the testator's heirs. Here, again, the testator thinks he hhs already
transferred his property, and hence is not likely to guard against
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a partial intestacy. Any instance, however, in which the testator
leaves a will and also leaves property not covered by the will,
involves the problem of partial intestacy, which we shall now
consider.
A. If the Surviving Spouse Elects to Take Under the Will,
May He or She Also Share in the Intestate Property?
We may answer this question inclusively by saying that the
surviving husband or wife, like any other heir, will inherit the
intestate property according to the terms of the statute, unless
he or she is excluded from this inheritance by some method known
to the law. It appears from the cases that the following methods
are the only ones recognized by the courts, or indeed urged upon
the courts, by which an heir may be excluded from intestate
property: (i) a direction in the will excluding the heir from
intestate property; (2) a gift to the heir upon the condition that
he relinquish his intestate interest; or (3) the doGtrine of equita-
ble election, by which the heir is conclusively presumed to ac-
quiesce in the disposal of his intestate property under the terms
of the will because he has accepted a gift in the will; (4) the
provisions of the statute which may be construed to mean that if
the surviving spouse accepts a provision in the will he or she is
precluded from taking any interest under the intestate laws. The
legal principles involved in all these cases are the same whether
the husband or wife survive; hence, for the sake of brevity, we
shall refer only to the surviving wife.
Directions in the will. There were some very early decisions
which seemed to hold that a testator by an express direction in
his will might disinherit one who was entitled to take under the
intestate laws.11 These cases have long since been overruled. As
early as 1797, Lord Chancellor Loughborough stated the law
succinctly:
"Neither an heir at law, nor by parity of reason next of kin, can be
barred by anything but a disposition of the heritable subject or per-
sonal estate to some person capable of taking. Notwithstanding all
words of anger or dislike applied to the heir, he will take what is not
11 Breton v. Pachell, I P. Wins. 548 (I7O6); ii VnhmR, ABRMIGMENT (1792)
185.
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disposed of. It is imp6ssible to make a different rule as to the personal
estate with regard to what is not disposed of. . . [There] being a
legal intestacy, am I to control the statute of distributions? How can
the court possibly do that? I must close the will and cannot look
at it." 12
It is well established now in both England and the United
States that an express disinheritance of any person has no effect
whatever upon the interest which that person will take under the
intestate laws.1" Consequently, if the testator wishes to disin-
herit a statutory heir, he must actually transfer his property to
some one else by deed or will. In the United States the widow is
a most favored heir; and there is no authority for holding that the
widow may be excluded from inheriting upon partial intestacy
by any express or implied direction of the testator. His fiat
cannot affect the passing of the intestate property, since this is
determined by the statute.
Gifts on condition. One may always dispose of property be-
longing to the devisee if he makes a gift to the devisee in his will
on the express condition that the devisee shall have this property
only if he confirms the disposition of his own property made by
the terms of the will.14 Under the decisions it is clear, however,
that a gift on condition will not be presumed, nor will the courts
employ the doctrine of conditional gifts to work out some general
purpose that they wish to further. If the gift is not clearly on an
express condition, the devisee will take it absolutely. 5 Undoubt-
edly the testator may make a gift to his widow or to any heir upon
condition that she relinquish her interest in the intestate prop-
erty; and if the gift is accepted, the intestate interest will be lost.
We shall not venture to discuss this method of depriving the
widow of her interest upon partial intestacy because where the
testator refers to intestate property in this connection, it is usually
apparent that he does so under the erroneous belief that he may
deprive any heir of intestate property by a mere direction, and
the reports do not show a single case involving the interests of
12 Pickering v. Stamford, 3 Ves. 492, 493-94 (,797).
13 Tea v. Millen, 257 Ill. 624, ioi N. E. 209 (1912); In re Trimble's Will, x99
N. Y. 454, 92 N. E. 1073 (91o); I TIFFANY, R.L PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) § 499.
14 2 JA MMr, WILs (4th ed. 1881) 2-4.
15 Burdis v. Burdis, 96 Va. 8i, 30 S. E. 462 (1898).
336
HUSBAND AND WIFE AS STATUTORY HEIRS
the widow upon partial intestacy in which it was even urged
upon the court that the gift was made upon the express condition
that the widow relinquish her interest in the intestate property.
The doctrine of equitable election. If the husband provides
for his wife in his will, it is held that such provision is presumed
to be in addition to dower unless the contrary appears from the
will itself, since dower is a property interest of the wife which the
husband cannot transfer by deed or will. Subject to this general
presumption, however, there grew up the doctrine of equitable
election by which "he who accepts the benefit under a deed or
will must adopt the whole conditions of the instrument, conform-
ing to all its provisions and relinquishing every right inconsistent
with it." 16 If the testator gives to another land in which his wife
has dower, and intends the devisee to take the land free from
dower, and if he makes provision for his wife in the will which
she accepts, then the courts of equity consider that it would be
inconsistent for her to accept the gift if she intends to deny her
husband's attempt to convey his land free from her dower.
Granted that he has no legal right to convey land free from dower,
the widow must acquiesce in this disposal of her property inter-
est if she accepts the provision in her husband's will. Equitable
election may apply to property not covered by the will, since the
testator may be presumed to dispose of another's property, either
because he erroneously thinks it is his, or, as in a gift on condition,
he intends to make the gift in his will only if the devisee acquiesces
in the disposal of his own property in keeping with the testator's
direction. The essential difference between a gift on condition
and the operation of equitable election is this: in a conditional
gift the testator expressly makes the gift upon the condition of
the transfer of the devisee's property, while under the doctrine
of equitable election he calmly disposes of the beneficiary's prop-
erty as if it were his own, and this disposition must be approved
by the devisee if he accepts the gift in the will.
It may be asked how is one to know under the doctrine of
equitable election whether the testator intends by this principle to
convey only property covered by the will free from his wife's dower
by means of her acceptance of the provision in the will, or
whether he intends the doctrine of equitable election to apply to
1" I JRAMAN, Wn s 443.
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intestate property also, so that he would mean the provision for
his wife in his will to be in lieu of her intestate property, as well
as of her dower interest in the, property covered by the will. We
shall see later that the answer to this question has caused great
difficulty in the decisions. At this point it is sufficient to note
that there is a well recognized and definite presumption in the
law, namely, that under the doctrine of equitable election the
testator is always presumed to intend to affect property in which
he has at least a partial interest, unless it expressly appear that he
intends to affect property wholly belonging to others. For in-
stance, Lord Thurlow, in Read v. Crop,"7 held that where the
testator made provision for his wife in lieu of dower, and by his
will devised his lands in four named counties to her for life and
to his children upon her decease, he meant by this devise to affect
only land in the counties named which he owned himself subject
to his wife's dower, and he did not mean to bar his wife under the
doctrine of equitable election from taking certain lands which
he and his wife owned jointly. This case reveals fully the force
of the presumption, since one might well argue that if the testator
devised lands il certain named places, he, intended to affect not
only his own lands but lands held by his wife jointly with him.
In cases of partial intestacy, however, this presumption indeed
is to be expected in keeping with the testator's usual intent; for
usually he intends his will to control only property covered by the
will, and the doctrine of equitable election applies to carry out
the intent to convey his land free from dower where his wife
accepts the provision made for her in the will.
Apart from qualifying circumstances, it seems somewhat ex-
traordinary for a man to purport to convey land which he knows at
his death will belong to another, even though he has made a gift
to this person in his will. 'Consequently, in our problem of partial
intestacy, we must conclude that the doctrine of equitable elec-
tion can never cause the widow to lose her interest in the intestate
property unless the testator uses such expressions in his will that
his intent cannot be limited to the property covered by the will,
but must necessarily also include the intestate property. A final
difficulty is presented by the statement that the doctrine applies
17 1 Bro. C. C. 492 (x785),
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on partial intestacy because the 'testator's intestate property on
his death belongs to his heirs, and he has no interest in it. There
may seem to be a verbal inconsistency here, but legally the state-
ment is accurate. When one dies leaving any intestate property,
such property belongs in law to those who are entitled to it
under the statute; it does not belong to the testator in the
sense that the testate property belongs to him, since he cannot
affect it by his will except in such manner as he might affect
property which belonged to someone else and in which he never
had an interest.
Unfortunately, the courts do not discuss the question of whether
a widow may take intestate property if she elects to take under
the will, upon the analysis which we have presented here, namely,
that she will always take intestate property in addition to the
interest which she takes under the will, unless she loses it either
by accepting a conditional gift, or because of the doctrine of
equitable election. The courts, however, discuss the question on
the basis of "intent." But it is difficult to ascertain the meaning
given to this term. It seems clear that it cannot mean that the
widow should lose her intestate interest because of an express
exclusion in the will, since we have seen that there is no modern
authority to support the proposition that the testator by his mere
fiat can affect the intestate property at all. Furthermore, it seems
equally clear that by intent they are not thinking of a conditional
gift, since we have seen that no cases have held that the widow
lost her intestate interest because the provision in the will was
accepted by her as a conditional gift. By necessary exclusion,
therefore, we must conclude that the courts have in mind some
application of the doctrine of equitable election, and by the use
of "implied intent" they mean that the gift in the will must be
considered as given to the widow not only in lieu of her dower
interest in the property covered by the will, but also in lieu of
her intestate interest. Under our analysis there has been no case
which on its facts cotild have resulted in a decision that the widow
lost her intestate interest by accepting a gift under the will. The
result of the cases, however, everywhere in the United States and
England today, in nearly all of the factual situations which have
come before the court thus far, is that the widow cannot take her
intestate interest if she accepts a testamentary gift. We shall
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therefore review the cases on the basis of the analysis which
appears in the decisions.
In most of the cases, the courts talk about equitable election in
addition to their general statements that the testator intended to
exclude the widow from the intestate property. Where they do
so, however, they do not make any distinction between equitable
election as it applies to property covered by the will, and the case
where the testator is presumed to have indicated the disposition
of property not covered by the will. Expressions by which the
testator gives specific property, or all his property for life, do not
reveal any intent which definitely applies to the property not
covered by the will.' 8 Since the presumption is that the testator
meant to affect only testate property which he could dispose of,
rather than intestate property not mentioned, it seems clear that
we really have in these cases no implied intent to exclude the
widow from the intestate property.
A more difficult question arises where the testator gives his
wife a proportional interest in all his estate for life, or in fee, in
lieu of dower. In Appeal of Jackson 9 the testator gave his wife
"in lieu of her dower, if she so elect, the equal one-third part of
all my estate both real and personal during her natural life." He
then made certain small bequests but made no disposition of the
balance of his property. The widow failed to renounce the will,
and the court held that she was barred from any share in the
intestate property because: "There is no intestacy of any por-
IS Walker v. Upson, 74 Conn. 128, 49 At. 994 (1902) (holding that the widow
is barred from intestate realty if she takes under the will); Hatch v. Bassett, 52
N. Y. 359 (1873) (widow may take intestate personalty if she also takes under
the will). Contra: Harmon v. Harmon, 8o Conn. 44, 66 At. 77, (x9o8); Mat-
ter of Hodgman, 14o N. Y. 421, 427, 35 N. E. 66o, 661 (1893) (where provision
was made for the widow in the will "in full satisfaction and recompense of and
for her dower or thirds which she may or can in any wise claim or demand," the
widow is barred from the intestate property). Cf. Pinckney v. Pinckney, i Bradf.
269 (N. Y. 1849). Where the gift to the widow is not made expressly in lieu of
dower, the courts usually say that the widow is impliedly barred 'from the intes-
tate property. See Smith v. Perkins, 148 Ky. 389, 146 S. W. 758 (1912). But this
is held not to apply where the widow is the only heir. Cf. Armstrong v. Berreman,
13 Ind. 422 (I859). For a full collection of the cases and a discussion of them in
terms of the analysis given by the courts, see A"r. CAS. i918B 986. See also
RooD, Wius (2d ed. 1926) § 757k, where many of the cases are listed according to
states.
19 126 Pa. 105, X7 AtI. 535 (1889).
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tion of the estate as to her. She gets one-third of it all, including
that portion of which the testator died intestate." '0 Except where
there is an expression giving the widow a proportional interest in
the estate, the Pennsylvania courts hold that the widow is not
barred from her intestate interest.2 ' Appeal of Jackson was de-
cided expressly on the ground that the giving of this proportional
interest indicated that the testator intended his wife to have a
proportional interest in both his testate and intestate property.
The basis of the actual decision seems to be the supposed direc-
tion in the will limiting the widow to one-third of the intestate
property. We have already noticed that this is impossible, since
the testator by his fiat alone cannot affect his intestate property.
If it be urged, however, that Appeal of Jackson can be justified
under the doctrine of equitable election, we must answer that the
words given may surely apply only to testate property, and hence
the presumption must be that the testator intends to affect only
his own property covered by the will rather than the property
which will pass to others on intestacy. This seems more clear
when we remember that even if the testator did intend to dispose
of his wife's intestate interest by employing the doctrine of equita-
ble election, he could not accomplish very much by so doing.
If the gift in the will is less than the widow's dower interest, she
may well elect to take against the will, and hence avoid equitable
election entirely. Furthermore, in the usual case the testator
gives his wife as much or more by the will than she would get
under her dower right; and in this case he could not change the
share she would have in the intestate property, even though he
employed equitable election. For instance, suppose the widow
has a statutory dower right of one-third of the personalty and the
realty of her husband. If the husband gives her "a one-third
interest in all my estate," it will make no difference whether he
thereby intends to include intestate property or not. If he does in-
tend the expression to cover intestate property, then she will get
one-third of the testate and one-third of the intestate property, and
in return for this she will have to surrender the third of the intes-
tate property that she would get under the law. But the result
20 126 Pa. at ioS-og, 17 Ati. at 535.
21 Carman's Appeal, 2 Penny. 332 (Pa. 1882); Reed's Appeal, 82 Pa. 428
(1876).
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would be the same if the words were read to apply only to testate
property, since she then would get a third interest in the intestate
property anyway. Or if the testator gives his wife a larger share
of his estate by will than she would get by statutory dower, the
doctrine of equitable election can operate only to the extent of her
interest as heir in the intestate property.22 Intestate property
that does not go to the widow passes to the other heirs, and they
are not affected by the fiat of the testator, unless it is accom-
plished by a gift to them.
Some cases in England and the United States have held that the
wife is barred from her interest in intestate property where there
is a devise of realty in which the wife had dower, but not where
there is a 'bequest of personalty.2 This result is based on the
theory that equitable election could not apply where the husband
gave the wife merely personalty, inasmuch as she had no dower
interest in personalty anyway. Such reasoning involves perhaps
an overemphasis on the theory that equitable election turns upon
compensation rather than forfeiture, and that there could be no
occasion for compensation by the widow to a disappointed legatee
where the gift to her was of personalty, since she had no dower
interest in the personalty, and hence had nothing to give up.
But it does not explain the American cases where the -wife has
a statutory dower interest in the personalty and also inherits it
as heir. The decisions seem to be erroneous upon principle,
since equitable election requires that if the wife is a devisee, and
land in which she has dower is willed to another, then she
must give up her dower interest. But the results reached are
defensible if we say, as in the previous cases, that the will affects
only the personal property it covers, unless by some condition
it purports to affect other property; hence the widow can take
intestate personalty whether the gift to her in the will is realty
or personalty, unless the testator precludes this by a gift on con-
dition or under equitable election. Some courts hold that the
22 In Pickering v. Stamford, 3 Ves. 332, 492 (1797), the court held that where
the will was intended to include all the property, and there was a lapsed legacy,
the wife might take her dower interest in this intestate property even though she
elected to take under the will and the gift was made in lieu of dower. In Lett v.
Randall, 2 De G. F. & J. 388 (1855), the opposite result was reached where the
intestacy appeared on the face of the will. These cases were followed in England
up to the passage of the Dower Act. 23 See cases cited supra note 18.
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giving of a life interest in realty to the widow does not deprive her
of her rights of dower or inheritance i n the intestate property, and
they reach the same result where the widow is 'the beneficiary
under a trust or is given an annuity charged upon realty. This
is a good result, but the reasoning erroneously turns on "implied
intent," as in gifts of personalty which we have discussed.
If it is true, as we have here suggested, that it is incorrect to
say that the testator has an implied intent to exclude the widow
from the intestate property, the reader may well ask upon what
analogies the courts have so persistently implied this doctrine.
We have already noted that a gift in a will is presumed to be in
addition to dower. This, of course, is conclusively overcome
where the doctrine of equitable election arises with respect to prop-
erty covered by the will itself. But there are many other instances
in which the courts say that they find sufficient evidence in the will
to overcome the initial presumption that the gift is in addition to
dower. For instance, if it appears that the widow could not have
dower in addition to the gift without defeating certain legacies,
or without interfering with the plan of the will, or indeed without
interfering with the general intent of the will, then the gift must
be considered in lieu of dower.2" These are instances of implied
intent taken from the whole character of the will, but they bear
only upon property covered by the will. Perhaps the crux of the
difficulty is that the courts make no serious distinction between
such implications of intent with reference to property covered by
the will and similar evidences of this intent in cases of partial
intestacy. The doctrines of gifts upon conditions and of equitable
election are adapted to cover cases of partial intestacy where the
beneficiary also has an intestate interest because these doctrines
are effective to control property clearly belonging to another, and
by analogy may be extended to include intestate property, which
on the testator's death will belong to others and cannot be affected
by his will. On the other hand, while the implied intent of the
testator may well control the question of whether the gift is in
lieu of dower or not with reference to the property covered by
the will, it can have no effect at all upon intestate property apart
from conditional gifts or equitable election.
2 Panlus v. Besch, 127 Mo. App. 255, 104 S. W. 1149 (19o8).
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There are a number of decisions which hold that apart from
statute the widow may share in the intestate property although
she takes under the will, regardless of the kind of property which
she takes by will. This is the force of the dictum by Lord
Chancellor Loughborough which we have already noticed.25 Chief
Justice Shaw reached the same result in Nickerson v. Bowley,26
in which he stated that the intestate property must pass accord-
ing to the law and that it must be the presumed intent of the
testator that it should so pass, in spite of any words of exclusion
in his will. A distinguished Illinois judge reached a like result
on similar reasoning, although he did not rely upon Nickerson
v. Bowley, and the case was not cited by counsel." The Massa-
chusetts case was followed in Michigan and New Jersey while an
Ohio court also reached the same result independently.28 These
decisions are fortunate in that they refuse to acknowledge that
the "intent" of the testator, either express or implied, as it ap-
pears in his will, can have any effect on the intestate property..
They are inadequate in that they fail to acknowledge that the
testator by a conditional gift or by the correct application, of
equitable election could deprive his widow of her intestate share.
They reach a good result without giving legal reasons that are
sufficient to insure a like result in similar cases. Indeed, the
decisions by Chief Justice Shaw and Chief Justice Carter were
subsequently ignored both in Massachusetts and Illinois.29
25 Supra note 12. 26 8 Metc. 424 (Mass. x844).
27 Carter, C. J., in Sutton v. Read, 176 Il. 69, 51 N. E. 8o (189S).
28 State v. Holmes, i5 Mich. 456, 73 N. W. 548 (1898); Skellenger v. Skel-
lenger, 32 N. J. Eq. 659 (i88o); Mathews v. Krisher, 59 Ohio St. 562, 53 N. E.
52 (1898). The result of these cases was summarized in RoOD, Wnr.s (ist ed.
1904) § 1497: "The heirs take by operation of law without any act or will of the
intestate. He can deprive them only by exercising the option the law gives him of
disposing of it while he lives, or giving it to others by will. . . . It does not mat-
ter how clearly the testator or intestate has expressed his wish that it should be
otherwise, the intestate property must be distributed according to law. The un-
favored children will take their regular shares; and the widaw must be given her
share of the intestate property, though she has elected to take under the will,
which declared that if she took under it she should have no more." In support of
this excellent summary, however, Mr. Rood gave no legal analogies, but merely
cited the cases discussed above, making no reference to the prevailing view to the
contrary in both England and the United States. In the second edition, published
in 1926, this statement was omitted and the cases were analyzed in the usual way.
See RooD, WnLLs (2d ed. 1926) § 157k.
29 Ellis v. Themond, 259 Ill. 583, 102 N. E. 8o (1913); Johnson v. Foss, 132'
Mass. 274 (882).
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Statutory provisions. We have seen in the cases of express
intent and implied intent already considered that .the courts in
England and the United States have generally held that the widow
may not take intestate property where there is a partial intestacy
and she elects to take under the will. This result has been com-
pletely secured under the statutes covering election in England
and in most of the United States today. Among the provisions
of the Dower Act are the following:
"VII. And be it further enacted, That a Widow shall not be en-
titled to Dower out of any Land of which her Husband shall die wholly
or partially intestate when by the Will of her Husband, duly executed
for the Devise of Freehold Estates he shall declare his Intention that
she shall not be entitled to Dower out of such Land, or out of any
of his Land.
"IX. And be it further enacted, That where a Husband shall devise
any Land out of which his Widow would be entitled to Dower if the
same were not so devised, or any Estate or Interest therein, to or for
the Benefit of his Widow, such Widow shall not be entitled to Dower
out of or in any Land of her said Husband unless a contrary Intention
shall be declared by his Will." 30
The seventh section of the Dower Act was obviously intended to
deal with election in the case of partial intestacy. The English
courts, however, have decided that the widow may not share in the
intestate property where she elects to take under the will. The
cases of Rowland v. Cuthbertson 31 and Lacey v. Hills2 ignored
the seventh section and held that the ninth section was conclusive
in providing that the surviving spouse who took under the will
was precluded from taking "any of his Land" upon partial in-
testacy. The court does not discuss the seventh section, which
expressly provides for the case of partial intestacy. It is obvious
that the interpretation of each section must be in the light of the
matters with which the section purports to deal, and that the
words there used must be interpreted in keeping with the ques-
tions at issue. Thus, in section nine, "any Land" is merely
a short collective phrase which is intended to be considered with
30 3 & 4 WM. IV, c. 105, §§ 7, 9 (1834). These sections were impliedly re-
enacted in i5 GEo. V, C. 23, § 49 (1925).
31 L. R. 8 Eq. 466 (1869).
32 L. R. ig Eq. 346 (1875).
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reference to the several interests listed in the first part of the sen-
tence; that is, the section undertakes to say not only that the
widow shall not have dower in her husband's land, as already
provided, in case her husband wills it away from her, but also
that she shall not have dower in any equitable or legal interest in
land or any incorporeal hereditament in which, under the Dower
Act, the widow now has a dower interest on intestacy, in case the
husband wills it away from her.
Thus the meaning of the last part of section nine might more
accurately have been expressed as follows: "Such widow shall
not be entitled to dower out of or in any such land or such other
property interests of her said husband unless a contrary intention
shall be declared by his will." Section nine does not expressly
refer to partial intestacy at all; it is dealing with testate property
and covers the change in law by which the husband can deprive
the wife of dower in any inheritable property covered by the will
in which she had dower by force of the Act. Section seven, on
the other hand, not only expressly provides for the case of partial
intestacy, but enacts the very rule for which we have been con-
tending, namely, that the surviving spouse may take intestate
property unless this is specifically excluded by the terms of the
will. It is significant that this statutory provision, adopted upon
the basis of the report of the Royal Commission, definitely enacts
this rule,3 and so by statute reaches the opposite result from that
33 I REPORT O F REAL PRoPERTY CoMMIssIoN (1829) i6-ig. The interpretation
of the seventh and ninth sections advanced in the text seems to be in keeping with
the Dower Act as a whole and to give full effect to all the other sections. Except
for the fist section, which is purely introductory, the other sections of the Dower
Act are as follows:
"I. And be it further enacted, That when a Husband shall die, beneficially
entitled to any Land for an Interest which shall not entitle his Widow to Dower
out of the same at Law, and such Interest whether wholly equitable, or partly
legal and partly equitable, shall be an Estate of Inheritance in possession, or equal
to an Estate of Inheritance in possession, (other than an Estate in Jointenancy,)
then his Widow shall be entitled in Equity to Dower out of the same Land.
"II. And be it further enacted, That when a Husband shall have been en-
titled to a Right of Entry or Action in any Land, and his Widow would be en-
titled to Dower out of the same if he had recovered Possession thereof, she shall
be entitled to Dower out of the same although her Husband shall not have re-
covered Possession thereof; provided that such Dower be sued for or obtained
within the Period during which such Right of Entry or Action might be enforced.
"IV. And be it further enacted, That no Widow shall be entitled to Dower out
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which is now reached by the courts apart from the statute, under
the court's interpretation of the Dower Act, and, as we shall see,
by statute also in the United States. The courts have followed
Hill v. Lacey and Rowland v. Cuthbertson in using section nine
of the Dower Act to exclude the widow from the intestate prop-
erty. Section seven has been ignored; and this interpretation
seems to be implied in the Real Property Act of 1925."4
The statutes in the United States governing election in wills
fall into three groups with respect to their provisions dealing with
the right to take intestate property where the surviving spouse
also elects to take under -the will: (a) States which provide that
if the widow takes any interest under the will, she is ipso facto
excluded from a statutory dower interest, unless the testator ex-
pressly provides the contrary; " (b) states which provide that a
gift of personalty in a will shall not bar the widow fron taking
her statutory dower interest, but that a gift of realty will so bar
the widow unless the testator expressly provides the contrary; 36
of any Land which shall have been absolutely disposed of by her Husband in his
Lifetime, or by his Will.
"V. And be it further enacted, That all partial Estate and Interests, and all
Charges created by any Disposition or Will of a Husband, and all Debts, Incum-
brances, Contracts, and Engagements to which his Land shall be subject or liable,
shall be valid and effectual as against the Right of his Widow to Dower.
"VI. And be it further enacted, That a Widow shall not be entitled to Dower
out of any Land of her Husband when in the Deed by which such Land was con-
veyed to him, or by any Deed executed by him, it shall be declared that his
Widow shall not be entitled to Dower out of such Land.
"VIII. And be it further enacted, That the Right of a Widow to Dower shall
be subject to any Conditions, Restrictions, or Directions which shall be declared
by the Will of her Husband, duly executed as aforesaid.
"X. And be it further enacted, That no Gift or Bequest made by any Husband
to or for the Benefit of his Widow of or out of his Personal Estate or of or out
of any of his Land not liable to Dower, shall defeat or prejudice her Right to
Dower, unless a contrary Intention shall be declared by his Will." 3 & 4 WM. IV,
C. 105 (834).
Yet the English textwriters support the interpretation of the courts. See THEo-
BALn, WiLs (8th ed. 1927) 889.
34 15 GEo. V, c. 23, § 49 (1925).
35 See, e.g., ALA. CIv. CODE (1927) §§ 10593-94. See Hilliard v. Benford's
Heirs, io Ala. 977, 99o (846). Statutes of this type are collected in i POM,-EROY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 494 et seq.
36 See, e.g., WIs. STAT. (1927) § 233:13; Hardy v. Scales, 54 Wis. 452, 11 N. W.
59o (1882). Statutes of this type are collected in I POMEROY, op. cit. supra note 35,
§ 496 et seq.
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(c) states with statutes which are phrased in terms of common
law dower and curtesy, requiring that the surviving spouse shall
be barred of dower or curtesy where the gift in the will is not
made expressly in addition to dower." The statutes listed in our
third group, since they turn on common law interpretation of
dower and curtesy, do not present any new issues. The second
group of statutes has somewhat similarly been considered under
the decisions in England and in some of our states, which hold
that a gift of personalty shall not bar the legatee from inheriting
on partial intestacy. This result seems sound insofar as it gives
alleviation in the case of a gift of personalty, but these statutes
themselves should not be interpreted to preclude the widow from
her interest in the intestate property where she does take a devise
of realty under the will, because these statutes in terms refer
only to the property covered by the will.
The first group of statutes are the most unqualified. The most
comprehensive statute in this group, that of Indiana, provides as
follows:
"Whenever any personal or real property be bequeathed to any wife,
or any pecuniary or other provision be made for her in the will of her
late husband, such wife shall take under such will of her late husband,
and she shall receive nothing from her husband's *estate by reason of
any law of descent of the State of Indiana, unless otherwise expressly
provided in said will, unless she make her election to retain the rights
in her husband's estate given to her under the laws of the State of
Indiana, which election shall be made in the manner hereinafter
provided." 38
The Indiana courts have 1held that the words of this statute pre-
clude the surviving spouse from sharing the intestate property
where she takes under the will. 9 Other states with statutes less
comprehensive than this have reached the same result.4" It is
true that this section says in terms that if the beneficiary takes
under the will, " she shall receive nothing from her husband's
estate by reason of any law of descent of the State of Indiana."
37 These statutes obtain in only a few states. They do no more than change
the common law presumption. See MAss. GEN. LAWS (1921) C. 189, § 8.
38 IND. ANN. STAT. (BuMs, 1926) § 3356.
39 Beshove v. Lyle, x14 Ind. 8, 16 N. E. 499 (1888).
40 See cases and statutes collected in i PomERoY, loc. cit. supra note 36.
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This might seem expressly to cover a share in intestate property
upon partial intestacy. In interpreting the words of this section,
however, we must note that the word "descent" in the Indiana
statutes is used to cover statutory dower, which is an interest
existing inter vivos, and hence cannot accurately be said to
"descend" according to the common law use of this word.41 The
Indiana decisions expressly hold that the word " descent" is not
to be considered in its common law significance where it is used
in statutes of descent in that state." In using the word" descent,"
therefore, the legislature may have had in mind no more than the
barring of statutory dower and curtesy in the property covered by
the will. It is also true that the statute says the widow taking under
the will "shall receive nothing from her husband's estate." This
may be regarded as specifically covering intestate property. It
seems fair to say, however, that the entire section is dealing with
the doctrine of election, and that this doctrine may at least apply
only to the property covered by the will. Nowhere in the section
is there a specific reference to intestate property; and we should
not interpret it as applying to intestate property, just as we have
concluded, in the cases not involving the statutes, that no expres-
sion with reference to the testator's property in which he excludes
his widow from her dower, if she takes under the will, should
apply to intestate property unless he makes this gift upon a con-
dition, or specifically undertakes to dispose of her intestate prop-
erty so as to involve equitable election.
If this is the law apart from statute, then the wording of the
statute in turn should involve intestate property specifically if it
is to bar the widow from her intestate interest; otherwise we
are taking unwarranted liberties with the words of the statute,
since we are interpreting them to change the course of descent
that is specifically set forth in statutes of equal solemnity and
much greater antiquity. Moreover, the decisions in Indiana re-
peatedly declare that the statutes of descent cover every pos-
sible case of inheritance upon intestacy.43 Real property law-
yers justly consider that the statutes affecting the inheritance of
41 See INhD. Am. STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 3337.
42 Rocker v. Mitzer, 7z Ind. 364, 86 N. E. 403 (1908).
43 Cloud v. Bruce, 6i Ind. 17' (1878); Bruns v. Cope, 182 Ind. 289, io5
N. E. 473 (1914).
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property cannot be uncertain or left in confusion without caus-
ing serious injury. Is it fair to say that the legislature would
intend to change its own statutes of descent in the case of partial
intestacy except by express words, particularly where we find
that the words the legislature used can reasonably apply to testate
property alone? There is not one of these statutes but can be
interpreted to apply only to testate property, and there is not one
of them which in express terms applies to intestate property. It is
submitted that these unqualified terms should be read as applying
to property covered 'by the will, and not to intestate property,
which by statutes equally sanctified passes to the intestate heirs.
B. If the Surviving Spouse Elects to Take Under the Law,
May He or She Also Take the Intestate Property as
Statutory Heir?
If the widow elects to take under 'the law and to renounce the
provision in her husband's will in her favor, she is undoubtedly
entitled to the common law or statutory dower interest in all of
her husband's property. Modem statutes usually state in terms
that the widow is entitled to a certain proportionate interest in
all the husband's property, and the significance of this is that it
cannot be taken from her by will. Hence if she elects to disre-
gard the will, she takes dower under the law in all his property.
At common law no difficulties of construction arose, since the
widow was not an heir in any case and since she was entitled to
her dower interest in all his property in every case. But as has
been mentioned,44 the statutory heirship of the surviving spouse
has had a significant effect upon the interpretation of her statu-
tory dower at the present time. In some states the statutory
dower interest of the widow is precisely the same as her interest as
heir, regardless of who the other heirs may be. In these jurisdic-
tions, as at common law, no question of interpretation arises.
Where there are no near relatives of the intestate, the widow is in
most states entitled to a much larger interest as heir. If she elects
to take under the law and against the will, we have the question
whether she is entitled only to her statutory dower interest in this
intestate property or to her larger interest as statutory heir.
44 See Supra pp. 331-32.
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It is submitted that in such cases she should take only her
statutory dower interest and not her share as statutory heir. This
result is opposed in most states on two grounds: (a) since she is
an heir under the law she is entitled to take as heir in intestate
property; " (b) in the case where she is the only heir and would
be entitled to all the property on intestacy, the property would
go to the state if she were allowed only a one-third interest, and
this result is undesirable because the statutes say that the prop-
erty is to escheat to the state only where there are no heirs. 6 The
first argument does not apply, since the widow has elected by her
own act to take not as heir, either express or statutory, but under
her statutory dower right. She has expressly elected to take
against the will of her husband, and property passing by intestacy
passes under the law, which is based upon the presumed intent
of the deceased. If she elects to take statutory dower, she has
expressly taken against the disposition of his property which the
law says is in keeping with his presumed intent where it is not
covered by his express will. Since such intestate laws are based
generally on such presumed intent, is it to be assumed that the
testator would intend his widow to take all his property as sole
heir, in the case of his intestate property, when it appears that
he has given her so little in his actual will that she was dis-
satisfied with it and insisted upon her statutory allowance?
The second argument is technically unsound, and can best be
explained by the abhorrence which the law is said to have for
escheat. It is technically unsound because it cannot be said that
the surviving spouse is an heir of the testator for this particular
case if by electing to take against the will she has expressly said
that she intends to take not as heir but in terms of her statutory
dower allowance. There can be no doubt of the significance of
this difference when we consider the elementary case that if she
were merely a statutory heir, the testator could will all his
property away from her. Thus, where the statutes say that
property shall escheat to the state only where there is not an heir,
they -mean by "C heir" one who takes upon intestacy, not one who
has a property interest in the estate of the deceased while he
45 Gamble v. Rooney, 192 Ind. 454, 134 N. E. 199 (1923); New England
Trust Co. v. Morse, 243 Mass. 39, 136 N. E. 835 (1923).
46 Cf. Armstrong v. Berreman, 13 Ind. 422 (1859).
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lived, which he could not bar by deed or will. So far as abhorrence
of escheat per se is concerned, this common law attitude, while
fully justified in feudal times, should not influence this case in
modern times, when we take much of all estates in inheritance
taxes, and by the Real Property Acts of 1925 in England all
intestate property goes to the state when the deceased leaves
neither widow nor near relatives." Moreover, under the majority
view, we are confronted with this extraordinary result: if the
wife elects to take under her husband's will, she is precluded from
taking any share in the intestate property; while if she elects
to defeat the will and take her statutory dower, she is also per-
mitted to take as intestate heir. The result of this is that in all
cases -f partial intestacy the advantage lies with the widow who
elects to defeat the will and take statutory dower. On the other
hand, the position advanced here would permit the widow to take
under the will and also to take her share of the intestate property,
while if she elects to defeat her husband's expressed intent and
take against the will, she is limited to her statutory dower. The
testator's express will and his presumed will, as indicated in the
intestate law, should be complementary. If the widow elects to
take her statutory dower, she should be held to take the interest
which is hers by marriage and is unaffected either by her hus-
band's will or by the laws of intestacy.
A few states, however, have reached the conclusion contended
for here." Since the widow's interest as statutory heir is greater
47 15 GEO. V, C. 23, § 46 (1925).
48 In re Noble, 194 Iowa 733, 19o N. W. 54 (1922); Harris v. Harris, 139 Md.
i87, 114 AtI. 909 (1921).
Courts of equity have always held that the widow was not bound by her elec-
tion to take under the will unless she had been duly informed of her rights both
under the will and under her dower and had had an adequate knowledge of the
character and extent of the estate. See I SCRIBNER, DoWR (2d ed. 1864) 484-88.
Furthermore, if the title to the property which she took under the will in lieu of
dower should later prove defective, she had a right in equity to renounce the pro-
visions of the will and take her dower. See ibid. at 494-95. There are statutes in
nearly all of the states by which these rights are specifically secured to the widow
with rather detailed provisions about the kind of information concerning the estate
to which the widow is entitled, as well as the time within which she is allowed to
make her decision. Even within the terms of such statutes, however, it remains
true that the widow may elect to take under the will with serious injury to herself
where she is not allowed to take the intestate property as heir; and it is submit-
ted that she may take against the will with undue advantage to herself if she is
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than her statutory dower interest, they hold consistently that the
widow shall take only her statutory dower interest in intestate
property where she elects to take against the will. The reason
given for this, however, seems unsound. It is said that the widow
by the terms of the statute is to take a certain interest "in the
estate of the intestate." Hence the court concludes that she can-
not take as heir where she takes against the will in a case of
partial intestacy, since the deceased did not die "intestate." "
It is submitted that this is sophistry. The deceased dies testate
with respect to the property covered by the will, and he dies in-
testate with respect to the property not covered by the will.
There is nothing in the common law understanding of these terms
nor in the fair intent of the legislature to cause any significance
to be attached to the use of the term" intestate" in the statute as
meaning a case in which the deceased died wholly intestate. Fur-
thermore, this argument proves too much, because we have had to
deal with similar statutes where the husband died partially intes-
tate and the widow elected to take under the will. In these cases
we have insisted that the widow should take the intestate property
unless she is excluded by some method known to the law.
It is not necessary to use this technical argument from the pre-
cise words of the statute in order to reach this result. If the
widow takes against the will, she should take only her statutory
dower interest in the intestate property because that is the interest
which the statute gives her whether the testator leaves a will or
not, and that is the interest which she has expressly elected to
permitted to take as statutory heir also. For instance, the amount of the intestate
property may be small compared with the property covered by the will. In this
case the widow's interest, as well as her natural wishes, may cause her to take
under the will, although she thereby loses the intestate property.
It is clear, therefore, that the present majority rule is contrary to the testator's
usual intent and contrary to the purposes of the intestate laws; it would be super-
ficial, as well as erroneous, to suggest that it is only sentiment which would keep
the widow from protecting her reasonabre interests under the majority rule at
present. In the first place, it is not " sentiment" in a depreciating sense that causes
the widow to carry out the will of her husband which represents in large meas-
ure the result of his life's work and aspirations, together with what he supposed was
the full approval and cooperation of his wife. In the second place, as in the in-
stance given above, the monetary interest of the widow, as well as the require-
ments of fair dealing, make it necessary for her to take under the will, although she
thereby loses her interest as heir in a smaller part of her husband's property.
-9 In re Noble, supra note 48.
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take. On the other hand, her interest as statutory heir is one
which she has expressly relinquished, since she has claimed her
statutory dower which is hers apart from her husband's will or
intestacy. Under the analysis submitted here, she could have
taken the provision in the will and the intestate property as heir,
but she elected not to do so. It is not necessary to discuss the phi-
losophy and economics that may be the presumed basis for the
intestate laws. Certainly the controlling element is to ,have the
property pass, subject to the interests of the state and the general
policy of the law, as nearly as possible in keeping with what would
have been the deceased's intent had he made a will. It is submitted
that one has to deny this intent characteristic of the intestate laws
if he is to say that the widow is still an heir as to intestate prop-
erty when she has elected to stand upon her rights of statutory
dower and has thereby defeated both the express and implied will
of the testator.0
Conclusion
We have seen that under the prevailing view the widow who
elects to take under the will is not permitted to share in the
intestate property; while if she elects to defeat the will, she is
given both her statutory dower and statutory share of the in-
testate property. Thus the widow who entertains a reasonable
respect for her husband's memory and elects to take under the
will, which has probably been drawn only after careful thought
by both the husband and wife, is precluded from taking her in-
testate interest in case of partial intestacy, even though it is
evident from the will that the husband tried to do everything he
could for his wife. On the other hand, if the widow elects to
defeat her husband's will in order, as she hopes, to get more by
taking her statutory dower right, she is then allowed to share in
the intestate property, although it could hardly be said that her
50 Under the analysis submitted above in this article, it would seem clear that
the widow should not lose her dower in land conveyed by her husband inter vivos
subject to dower, where she also takes under the will, unless the will, under equi-
table election, expressly excludes her from this interest, which is no longer dower
in her husband's land, but dower in lands of the alienee. A majority of the cases,
however, hold the contrary. See Westbrook v. Vanderburgh, 36 Mich. 3o (1877).
Contra: Hall v. Smith, 103 Mo. 289, 15 S. W. 621 (i891). The cases are collected
in ROOD, W LS (2d ed. 1926) § 757k.
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husband would be anxious for her to share in it, since she had
renounced the provision made for her and taken what the law
gave her, in defiance of the will. One practical result of this may
be that the widow who acts in a civilized manner will receive less
than the widow who presses her claims as graspingly as possible.
There are perhaps three explanations for the results which the
courts have reached in the situations'we have considered: (i) The
doctrine of equitable election arose at a time when dower had
ceased to be a "favorite of the law" and had become a source of
inconvenience to conveyancers and a cause of litigation which the
courts of equity were anxious to destroy. For instance, the chan-
cellor had developed his doctrine that equitable estates after the
Statute of Uses were not subject to dower, although they were
subject to curtesy, and that a lease for a term of years which ex-
tended after the husband's death also was not subject to dower.
These doctrines have never been defended analytically, nor have
their injuries to the widow been justified. As a matter of explana-
tion, therefore, although not of justification, it is not difficult to
understand why the courts would be equally anxious to destroy
dower in case of partial intestacy where the widow elects to take
under the will. (2) A second explanation is the one that has
been given in defense of the decision in Lett v. Randall,5 namely,
that the testator intended "to buy dower for his heirs." Even as
an argument in general explanation, this has no application at the
present time when his wife not only has statutory dower, but is a
favored heir on intestacy. As we noted at the beginning, doc-
trines which had some justification under common law curtesy
and dower became grotesque in view of the statutory changes
which everywhere prevail today. How can it be said that the
testator "intends" to bar his wife's intestate interest for his
"heirs" when today his wife is the most favored of all his heirs?
(3) It may be urged finally that although there is no analytical
justification for the courts' decisions in these cases, the courts
nevertheless use the analogy -of some of the principles recognized
in the law in order to reach a result which is desirable; hence they
are making law through the application of recognized principles
to analogous cases. But under modern conditions, is there any
occasion for wishing to reach this result? Is there any reason to
51 Lett v. Randall, 2 De G. F. & J. 388, 391n. (1855); see note 22, supra.
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believe that the husband intends to bar his wife's interest in the
intestate property, if he does not refer specifically to intestate
property, when the same presumption under a similar gift in the
will would not be made in the case of his son or some other heir?
Today the wife inherits both realty and personalty as a favored
heir; the common law analogies by which the husband might want
to free his estate from dower'for the benefit of his blood relatives
no longer apply. And in their usual results the decisions of the
courts represent the direct antithesis of what the testator proba-
bly intended. Usually, of course, the husband does not expect to
die partially intestate, and where he does contemplate any in-
testacy, he considers that the property will go according to the
law to his heirs, of whom his wife is one. Usually the testator has
attempted to provide for his wife as fully as his property per-
mitted; it would be a cruel thing for him to contemplate that in
case property should come to him and should not be covered by
his will, his wife would then have no share in the intestate prop-
erty, and her loyalty in taking under the will would be the cause
of her own injury. Indeed it was his astonishment at the result
in these decisions which first caused the writer to inquire into
their analytical validity. In the absence of some affirmative evi-
dence to the contrary, therefore, we must refuse to suppose that
the courts would venture to make new law in order to reach a
bad result.
II
The problems of interpretation where property passes by
will or by intestacy affect mainly the interests of creditors. This
field of the law is considerably affected by statute, many jurisdic-
tions providing that the dower interest is not free 'from debts of
the husband, as it was at common law. Others, however, by
judicial decision alone have held that the dower interest is free
from the claims of creditors under the modem statutes since
dower was free from creditors at common law.5" It would seem
52 Often the courts make the result turn on whether the statute gives the widow
dower in land of which her husband was "seized during marriage" (as in common
law dower), or whether the statutory dower is in land of which the husband died
seized. Cases are collected in i Tn AN , REAL PRoPERTY § 222.
It may be said that since dower is an inchoate estate which the husband can-
not transfer by deed, it must be a separate estate unaffected by his debts. This is
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that this is a question which should be covered by statute in every
case. Perhaps where the legislature has not dealt with it the
analogy of the common law must be applied to statutory dower,
but it must be conceded that -the results in the two cases are very
different. Thus at common law the dower interest was only a
one-third interest in the land for life. Accordingly the creditors
had the great bulk of the estate from which to enforce their
claims. Under modern statutes, however, it is a rather serious
thing to let the widow take one-third of the realtysin fee free from
the claims of creditors, regardless of the amount of property in-
volved. To except one-third of a man's total estate, regardless
of its value, from the claims of creditors may result at the present
time in great injury to his creditors, and at the same time leave
the widow decidedly more than reasonable protection for life.
A. Should Statutory Dower and Curtesy Pass as Separate
Estates Free From the 'Claims of Creditors?
At common law, the husband's marriage made him liable for
his wife's antenuptial debts, and during coverture she could con-
tract no further debts. Hence his curtesy did not come to him
free from any of her debts. But in nearly all jurisdictions now,
statutory curtesy passes free from the wife's postnuptial debts. 3
probably fair, although if the courts had held that statutory dower passed subject
to the husband's debts unless it were expressly provided otherwise, this would not
have been an unreasonable interpretation, since dower is not a separate estate in the
sense that it may be transferred separately by the owner during the life of the
husband. States which provide by statute that the widow shall have dower only
in lands of which her husband died seized have in effect destroyed dower as an
estate in land and have made it no more than forced heirship. Consequently, the
proposal made here is less radical than the present law in many states. The pro-
posal offered is that dower be retained as an inchoate estate in keeping with the
common law as a protection to the widow against a voluntary conveyance inter
vivos by the husband, but that it be subject to his debts, except for the minimum
allowance to the widow.
At the present time when the wife can control her property during marriage
and when land itself is subject to creditors during the debtor's life and on his
death, it is clear that many of the purposes of common law dower are no longer
involved. Insofar as dower covers a minimum protection for the widow, it should
be free from creditors; but insofar as it represents a fair division of his estate, it
should -be subject to creditors, just as her inheritance would be subject to creditors
if the husband had owned only personalty.
53 See e.g., INn. AN. STAT. (BuMs, 1926) § 3345. See also notes 54-5g, infra.
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The surviving husband is thus often favored more than the sur-
viving wife, although surely this was never the intent of the
legislature. By historical analogy erroneously applied, the courts
reach a result by which the just claims of creditors are defeated
in order to give an extraordinary advantage where it is not needed.
For example, a statute may provide that the surviving husband
shall take a one-third interest in his wife's realty, "subject to her
antenuptial debts." " The courts have interpreted this to mean
that he takes this property free from her postnuptial debts. From
the history of this statutory provision, it does not appear that it
was anything more than a statement of the common law that the
husband was liable for his wife's antenuptial debts. The statute
was passed before the Married Woman's Property Acts, and hence
applied to common law conditions.
Apart from special exceptions, the rule everywhere is that one's
own property is liable for the debts that he himself contracts. Yet
under the prevailing view, a married woman may pile up any
amount of debts during marriage, and on her death her husband
will take his interest in her realty free from these debts. Conse-
quently, the married woman could be the main purchaser for the
family, and in the absence of proved fraud, the inheritance of the
husband would be free from the debts in which he had benefited.
It seems fair to say that the statute covering curtesy applied to the
common law conditions which obtained when it was passed, and
that the wife's land should not be inherited free from her own
debts, whenever contracted. This disregard of the legitimate in-
terests of creditors in this instance seems to show again the ten-
dency of the courts to construe the modern statutory dower and
curtesy in a literal manner without regard to the differences
between these modern provisions and common law dower and
curtesy. Furthermore, the interpretation of these statutes is usu-
ally made purely on a basis of the local law, and without a con-
sideration of the debisions in other states where similar statutes
obtain.5"
There are several instances in which the dower interest is con-
54 Kemph v. Belknap, 15 Ind. App. 77,43 N. E. 89i (1895).
55 Generally, as in Rocker v. Mitzer, supra note 42, the states have held that
statutory curtesy is free from the wife's postnuptial debts. Cases are collected in
I TisPAN, REAL PROPERTY § 243.
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strued advantageously to the widow, although the result thus
reached may be doubtful where the widow is given a large propor-
tion of the property free from the claims of creditors. This is true
where the widow is allowed to have the mortgage debt paid from
the personalty, if there is personalty not disposed of, in preference
to the sale of the land itself, although she joined in the mortgage
deed." A similar result is reached where the courts treat the
widow's dower interest in land mortgaged by a deed signed by both
husband and wife as if the widow were mortgaging her separate
property for the husband's debt, and hence under the law of
suretyship would be entitled to exoneration in full.5" The result
in both these situations seems sound analytically, and perhaps
fortunate where common law dower obtains, but the effect on
creditors or on the interests of others in the estate may be unfor-
tunate where the widow receives a large interest free from her
husband's debts. In these cases the best solution would seem to
be not a change of the rule of law, but a change in the statute,
making the provision for the widow subject to creditors.
B. Proposed Statutory Changes
We ventured to suggest at the beginning that we were dealing
with a field of law in which considerable statutory changes might
well be adopted at this time. First, should we not have reasonable
uniformity in all intestate laws in the several states in keeping with
our uniform statutes in commercial law? In Canada the several
provinces have gone far in adopting their uniform intestate
statutes. 8 Granted that some diversity may be permissible or
even desirable, it would certainly result in preventing much con-
fusion and occasional injustice if there was reasonable conformity
in the intestate laws, with reference particularly to statutes affect-
ing husband and wife. Secondly, is our present general plan by
which the widow receives a proportion, usually one-third of the
realty and personalty, of the estate under statutory dower or as
58 Hays v. Cretin, X02 Md. 695, 62 Atl. 1028 (i9o6). Contra: Gibson v. Cre-
hore, 5 Pick. 146 (Mass. 1827).
57 Gore v. Townsen, io5 N. C. 228, ir S. E. 16o (189o). Contra: Hawley v.
Bradford, 9 Paige 200 (N. Y. 1841).
58 See (1925) CANADIAN" B. A. REP. appendix B and C.
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statutory heir, a good one? Is it helpful to the widow, where her
husband leaves $5,000 in realty, to give her a one-third interest in
fee? In practice this necessitates the expense -of partition, with
the result that a small estate is almost wholly lost to the widow as
well as to the other heirs. And if the heirs by agreement avoid a
court partition, we still have the vicious circle of the French legi-
tim, or forced heirship: on the one hand, no one of the heirs is
financially able to take the whole farm or urban property and pay
the other heirs in money for their interests; on the other hand, a
physical partition of the small farm or urban lot is economically
injurious to all the heirs.59 Should not the interests of the surviv-
ing spouse, as well as the extent to which these interests pass free
from the claims of creditors, vary with the amount of property
involved? 60
In England and in some American jurisdictions, the property
passing to the surviving spouse on intestacy does vary with the
amount involved. The immediate proposal here is that this prin-
ciple be adopted uniformly for intestate property in the several
states, and that it also be applied to statutory dower and curtesy.
The writer ventures to put these suggestions into definite proposals
on the assumption that the form given here is merely for purposes
of discussion to illustrate the principles involved.
(i) In the case of intestate property, the surviving spouse
should take all the personalty up to $5,ooo, and a life interest in
the realty up to $I5,ooo. This should be free from the claims of
creditors, up to $2,ooo, in the case of the widow only. Apart from
this provision, all intestate property should pass under the intes-
tate laws as they are now in each jurisdiction, subject to the
claims of creditors.
(2) In case of testate property, the widow should have a com-
pulsory right to four-fifths of the personalty and a life interest in
the realty up to $i5,ooo, free from the claims of creditors up to
$2,oo0. The surviving husband should have the same interest
subject to the claims of creditors.
(3) The first and second provisions should not be allowed in
59 See Charmont, Conflict of Interests Legally Protected in French Civil Law
(1919) 13 ILL. L. REv. 693; AlmAGALA, COmPARATIV LEoAL PnLosoP y (Lisle tr.
1921) CC. 21-22.
60 See 15 GEo. V, C. 23, 49 (X925) ; MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) C. 190.
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addition to homestead or minimum allowance laws for the surviv-
ing spouse, in states where these now obtain.
(4) In all property above the minimum provided for in the
preceding sections, the present dower and curtesy statutes in each
jurisdiction, subject to the claims of creditors, should prevail up
to $ioo,ooo. In estates over $ioo,ooo, whether realty or person-
alty, the surviving spouse should have a one-fifth interest, subject
to the claims of creditors, in the realty and personalty in all prop-
erty over $ioo,ooo.
Limited space precludes a discussion of these provisions. We
may, however, make some brief references. The provisions follow
in part the present English statute by which the surviving spouse
takes all the intestate property up to £i ,ooo, and the Massachu-
setts statute by which the interest of the surviving spouse in in-
testate property varies with the amount of the estate."' The first
and second sections are designed to prevent the wasteful division
of small estates. For instance, if the widow has no children, she is
still entitled to this small property in keeping with her needs. If
she has small children, she needs the whole estate to combine with
her own enterprise and frugality in supporting her family. It is
obvious that merely putting the $5,000 out at five per cent interest
would not support the poorest family; hence to give the property
to the widow in strict trust or guardianship for her children would
be wasteful and futile and too complicated for legal enforcement
in such small estates. In the final case, where the children are
grown, their earning power will care for them, while the needs of
the widow increase with age. Sections one and two likewise give
the widow life interests in realty, and hence prevent the waste of
partition in small estates. In addition, they preserve the claims of
creditors and freedom of testation for the deceased, even in small
estates, except insofar as the clear social interest in the minimum
protection of the widow and children demands their partial abro-
gation. Finally, all the proposals given are intended to be subject
to local qualifications. For instance, the monetary divisions of
$2,000, $5,ooo and $ioo,ooo in the first, second, and fourth sec-
tions might vary in different parts of the country, while each state
would make many additional provisions, as in the case of a
second childless wife.
61 See statutes cited supra note 6o.
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Conclusion
There have been numerous criticisms of our "grotesque inherit-
ance laws," 2 and it has been asserted by high authority that the
scheme of inheritance at common law could only be explained on
the ground that it was designed as an insult to a system of law
which was otherwise justly admired for its reason and its service-
ability.63 We have noted that antenuptial agreements in lieu of
dower are not adapted to our people, who regard them with dis-
taste. It is important, therefore, to retain the compulsory statu-
tory dower and have it cover nearly all of the property where the
estate is very small. On the other hand, we have long experience
to prove that large estates involve complicated interests which no
general rule of compulsory proportional division can handle. If
we mean to preserve statutory dower for large estates, it is the part
of caution to make this interest smaller, so that the parties will not
be invited to destroy it by agreements, and so that it will be a
reasonable provision in case the parties do not make a differ-
ent agreement. For instance, the equal division of estates under
community property is often commended. Yet on the continent of
Europe where this doctrine obtains, it is everywhere abrogated by
private agreement. Furthermore, in the United States the dis-
position of large estates by husband and wife is usually not in
accord with the statutory provisions.
We may note, finally, that where the estate is small, the interests
of the surviving spouse and all the children make it fair that the
property pass to him or her. Roughly, where the estate is more
than the minimum and still does not involve the complications of
62 Ballantine, Our Grotesque Inheritance Laws (1913) 25 GREEN BAG 253.
63 " To give the reader an idea of the English common law on this subject [in-
testate law], it would be necessary to begin with a dictionary of new words; and
presently, when they should discover the absurdities, the subtilties, the cruelties,
the frauds, with which that system abounds, they would imagine that I had written
a satire, and that I wished to insult a nation otherwise so justly renowned for
its wisdom.
"It is to be observed, however, that the right of making a will reduces this evil
within tolerably narrow limits. It is only the succession to the property of intestates
which is obliged to pass through the crooked roads of the common law. Wills in
that country may be compared to arbitrary pardons, which correct the severity of
penal laws." BENTHAm, TEoRY or LEGISLATION (Hildreth ed. 2876) 182-83. See
also M.rL, PRINciPLEs or Po LricAL ECONOmy (ist Am. ed. 1864) bk. 2, § 3.
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great estates, it is likely that the attempted fair division of the
property under modern statutory dower or community property
will usually approximate the contributions of husband and wife.
But where the property is very large, this is much less likely to be
true. While the husband usually makes generous provision for his
widow, it is unwise to compel this by statutory dower in large
estates. Often the husband wants to provide for his family by a
living trust or other conveyance inter vivos. The provisions sug-
gested would protect the reasonable claims of the surviving spouse
in all cases. The additional complications of large estates are
more efficiently and more justly handled by the arrangements of
the parties in each particular case.
Is it wise for us to continue an arbitrary rule of statutory dower
which will be circumvented in the case of large estates? " On the
other hand, may we not say that it is sound legislation to recognize
the social interest in a minimum of protection for the individual
by giving the surviving spouse all or nearly all of the property in
small estates? With reference to the proposal that no statutory
dower or curtesy be free from the claims of creditors except the
minimum allowance for the widow, we have Professor Gray's
teaching that the common law scheme of things is based upon the
general assumption that he who is free to acquire must also be
free to lose. 5 With the possible exception of the interpretation of
estates by the entireties in some of our states at present, 6 there is
perhaps no other instance in the law today where large amounts
of property may be kept from sale to pay valid claims with as little
social justification as in the case of statutory dower and curtesy.
The analogy to the spendthrift trust is not involved." The legal
64 Dean Pound has set forth the limits of effective legal action. Pound, Limits
of Effective Legal Action (1916) 22 PA. B. A. REP. 221; see BENTITA, PRINCIPLES
or LEGISLATION (2d ed. 1871) c. 12.
65 GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION (2d ed. i895) preface.
66 Note (X924) 37 HARV. L. REv. 66.
67 It may be said that the burden is on the creditor to collect his own debts and
if he fails to take security where the debtor fails to pay, he has only ftimself to
blame. In support of this position there may be cited the bankruptcy laws, and
the doctrine of spendthrift trusts which is generally recognized in the United States
and is somewhat covertly enforced in England. But bankruptcy laws are generally
justified on the basis of the minimum protection for the individual and the indirect
advantage to commerce. And the spendthrift trust is different from the passing
of statutory dower free from creditors in at least several significant respects:
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basis of common law dower is that it passes free from the hus-
band's debts, since it was the wife's inchoate property while he
lived. But where the dower interest is greatly increased by statute,
the legislature should also provide that it be subject to the hus-
band's debts, except for a minimum provision for the widow.
Otherwise, by historical analogy to common law dower, we reach
an indefensible result. The usual basis for allowing property to
pass free from the claims of creditors is the reasonable protection
of the individual. This cannot be said to govern where the widow
takes a third of the realty in fee free from creditors, although the
testator may leave several millions in realty subject to unsecured
debts, or debts secured by mortgages subject to dower; and the
result seems even worse where the husband takes a third of his
wife's realty free from her postnuptial debts.
Paul L. Sayre.
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(i) It is created by individuals who have enough money to do such things; it is not
imposed generally by statute on all property. (2) Property subject to a spend-
thrift trust is of course subject to all debts contracted by the trustee that are ex-
pressly made binding on the trust property itself. It is only the anticipated income
which is free from claims of creditors of the beneficiary. (3) From the point of
view of the beneficiary and his creditors, a spendthrift trust involves only income
for the beneficiary, which is always subject to creditors if they can find it in the
hands of the beneficiary. In contrast, statutory dower in some jurisdictions is im-
posed on all property by legislation, passes to the widow free from all debts of
the husband, and frequently gives the widow an absolute interest in and complete
control over realty, and thus is capital, rather than income as in the case of the
spendthrift trust.
